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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas III*
William M. Clifton III**
W. Jonathan Martin II***
and Alyssa K. Peters****
I. INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys revisions to the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) and decisions interpreting Georgia law from June 1,
2015 to May 31, 2016 that affect labor and employment relations for
Georgia employers.
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II. RECENT LEGISLATION

A. ProtectingGeorgia Small Businesses Act
The "Protecting Georgia Small Businesses Act" 1 will become effective
January 1, 2017.2 The purpose of the Act is to clarify the employment
relationship between a "franchisor" and a "franchisee." 3 Under the Act,
"neither a franchisee nor a franchisee's employee shall be deemed to be
an employee of the franchisor for any purpose." 4 The Act states the terms
"franchisor" and "franchisee" have the same meanings as in 16 Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) section 436.1.5 "Franchisormeans any person who grants a franchise and participates in the franchise relationship."6 "Franchiseemeans any person who is granted a franchise." 7 However, the Act does not apply to Chapter 9 of Title 34 of the O.C.G.A.,8
which relates to workers' compensation. 9

B. Amendments to Employer Unemployment Contributions
In addition to enacting O.C.G.A. § 34-1-910 on January 1, 2017, the Act
also amended Chapter 8 of Title 34 as of July 1, 2016, which relates to
employment security." The Act provides the Commissioner of Labor
(Commissioner) authorization "to submit to and receive from the state
revenue commissioner certain information related to persons paying into
or receiving funds" from the Unemployment Trust Fund (Fund).1 2 Further, penalties are provided "for the unlawful divulging of certain confidential information" relating to the Fund. 13
The Act also enacts O.C.G.A. § 34-8-130,14 which adds authorization
for the Commissioner to submit names and social security numbers of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
cerning
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
2016)).
12.
13.
14.

Ga. S. Bill 277, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9 (Supp. 2016)).
Id. § 3.
See O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9(a).
O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9(b).
O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9(a) (referencing Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions ConFranchising, 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (2015)).
16 C.F.R. § 436.1(k).
16 C.F.R. § 436.1(i).
O.C.G.A. tit. 34 ch. 9 (Supp. 2016).
O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9(c).
O.C.G.A. § 34-1-9 (Supp. 2016).
Ga. H.R. Bill 904, Reg. Sess. (2016) (amending O.C.G.A. tit. 34 ch. 8 (2008 & Supp.
Id. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-8-130 (Supp. 2016).

§

34-8-130 (Supp. 2016)).
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individuals, and names of any employer along with the number of employees who are being reported, for the state revenue commissioner to
verify and report back submitted earnings.' 5 Further, "[n]othing in this
Code Section shall prevent the Department of Revenue .

. .

. access to

records or information provided for under Code Section 34-8-125."16
Lastly, the Act amends O.C.G.A. §§ 34-8-151, 34-8-155, 34-8-180, 348-181, and 34-8-185.17 A statutory provision in the Act explains the following:
For periods on or after January 1, 2017, but on or before December 31,
2022, each new or newly covered employer shall pay contributions at
a rate of 2.64 percent of wages paid by such employer with respect to
employment during each calendar year until the employer is eligible
for a rate calculation based on experience ... .18

There are variations from the standard rate addressed in different provisions of the Code.' 9 "For the periods on or after January 1, 2017, but on
or before December 31, 2022, there is an administrative assessment of
0.06 percent to be assessed upon all wages as defined in Code section 348-49 .. . . ."20 The Act provides an automatic repeal of Article 6 of Chapter
8 of Title 34 from December 31, 2016, until January 1, 2023.21 Article 6
of Chapter 8 of Title 34 relates to administrative assessments.
III. WRONGFUL TERMINATION
A. Employment at Will
Overview
1.
"Employment at-will in other jurisdictions may be weakening, but in
Georgia the presumption remains that all employment is at-will unless a
22
statutory or contractual exception exists." Unlike other states, in which

15. Ga. H.R. Bill 904 § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-8-130).

16. O.C.G.A § 34-8-130(b).
17. Ga. H.R. Bill 904 §§ 2 to 6.
18. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-151(d) (Supp. 2016).
19. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-155 (Supp. 2016).
20. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-180(b) (Supp. 2016).
21. Ga. H.R. Bill 904 § 5 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-8-181 (Supp. 2016)).
22. W. Melvin Haas III et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 159, 161 (2013). See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 18-4-7 (2015 & Supp. 2016)
(mandating that an employer cannot discharge an employee whose earnings are subject to
garnishment); O.C.G.A. § 34-1-3 (2008) (providing that employers cannot discharge an employee who are absent from work as a result of being required to attend a judicial proceeding
in response to a court order).
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the judiciary has created public policy exceptions to the common law doctrine, Georgia's doctrine of employment at-will is statutory. 23 As a result,
the judiciary cannot amend the doctrine. 24 It must be done legislatively. 25
In short:
In Georgia, the general rule is that an employee, employed at will and
not by contract, cannot bring an action against his employer for wrongful discharge from employment or wrongful interference with the employment contract when and where he is an at will employee with no
definite and certain contract of employment. The employer with or
without cause and regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability. 26

"An indefinite hiring" is at-will employment. 27 The definition of an indefinite hiring includes contract provisions specifying "'permanent employment,' 'employment for life,' [and] 'employment until retirement."' 28
Further, a contract specifying an annual salary does not create a definite
period of employment. 29 Even if an employment contract does specify a
definite period of employment, any employment beyond that period becomes employment at-will subject to discharge without cause. 30
2.
Exceptions to Employment at Will
In certain instances, offer letters that contain a strictly defined employment period, among other necessary terms of employment, can be
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of at-will employment.
For instance, in Tricoli v. Watts,3' the plaintiff argued his offer letter incorporated the policy and terms of the Board of Regents, and consequently he was not terminable at will. 32 The Georgia Court of Appeals

ruled the policy language the plaintiff relied upon did not create a definite term of employment because it did not state, as a consequence of the

23. See O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008).
24. Eckhardt v. Yerkes Reg'l Primate Ctr., 254 Ga. App. 38, 39, 561 S.E.2d 164, 165
(2002).
25. Id. at 39, 561 S.E.2d at 165-66 (declining to create public policy exception for whistle blowing activities).
26. Id. at 38, 561 S.E.2d at 165.
27. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008).
28. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (1978).
29. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273, 444 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1994).
30. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 147-48, 534 S.E.2d 533,
533-34 (2000).
31. 336 Ga. App. 837, 783 S.E.2d 475 (2016).
32. Id. at 839, 783 S.E.2d at 477-78.
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Board's failure to provide the plaintiff notice, that the plaintiffs employment would be renewed or otherwise extended. 33 Thus, as a matter of
law, the policy language did not overcome the presumption of terminable
employment. 34
Notwithstanding, an employer's publications can give rise to contractual actions in certain situations. 35 In Shelnutt v. Mayor & Alderman of
Savannah,36 firefighters sued the City of Savannah for breach of contract
after they were promoted without receiving raises pursuant to the City's
Pay Policy referenced in their employee handbook. The City filed a motion to dismiss, citing the Handbook's disclaimer that stated it "does not
constitute an expressed or implied contract." 37 Treating the Pay Policy
and the Handbook as one document, the trial court dismissed the firefighters' claim without further discussion. The firefighters appealed.38
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.3 9
In finding the Pay Policy an enforceable contract, the court of appeals
held the trial court erred when it treated the City's Pay Policy and Handbook as one document. 40 The City's Handbook did not include the text of
its Pay Policy or explicitly incorporate it, but instead merely referenced
41
Consequently, because
the policy in a list of employment related topics.

the two documents were considered separately, the disclaimer did not
42
apply to the Pay Policy.

Further, the court of appeals determined the Pay Policy unequivocally
provided for a definite, calculable salary increase upon the firefighters'
promotion. 43 The court made this determination despite the policy's language allowing the City Manager to make necessary exceptions in her
discretion. 44 The court found this qualifying language did not make the
policy wholly discretionary nor did it affect the mandatory nature of the
policy. 45 Rather, the manager was required to follow the policy unless she

decided an exception was essential in a particular case. 46
33. Id. at 839, 783 S.E.2d at 478.
34. Id.
35.

JAMES W. WIMBERLY, JR., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

333 Ga. App. 446, 776 S.E.2d 650 (2015).
Id. at 448, 776 S.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 446-49, 776 S.E.2d at 652-54.
Id. at 454, 776 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 449, 776 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 448, 776 S.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 449, 776 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 451-52, 776 S.E.2d at 655-56.
Id. at 452-53, 776 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 453, 776 S.E.2d at 656-67
Id. at 453, 776 S.E.2d at 656.

§§.1

to 9 (3d ed. 2000).
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B. Breach of Employment Contract (Other than At-Will)
1.
Formulation of Employment Contracts
For an employment agreement to be enforceable, it must include all
traditional elements of a contract: offer, acceptance, and consideration. 47
Additionally, it must include all necessary terms and the terms must be
definite." During the Survey period, in Mosaic Business Advisory Services, Inc. v. Stone,49 the court upheld a jury verdict in favor of enforcing
the terms of a bonus agreement based on a company's net profits, even
though the agreement did not include details such as the timing of payment or minimum cash reserves the business would retain.5 0
In Mosaic, Stone and Olives opened a consulting firm, named Mosaic,
together. The next year, Olives fired Stone. A few days after the termination, Olives and Stone reconciled and agreed to continue discussion of
Stone's compensation. For weeks, the parties continued to discuss the
compensation agreement orally and by email. Eventually, they agreed
that sixty-five percent of the net profit resulting from a project would be
paid to the person in charge of that project, and Mosaic would retain the
rest for operating expenses. After attempts to finalize other details, including the timing of payments, minimum cash reserves, and founder departure safeguards, the parties' negotiations broke down. Throughout negotiations, Stone continued her employment with Mosaic. Shortly
thereafter, Olives informed Stone that he wished to dismantle the business, and Stone subsequently resigned. Mosaic did not pay Stone her July
2012 bonus, and Stone filed a breach of contract action. The jury found
for Stone.5 1 Mosaic appealed arguing the mid-year bonus was not enforceable because of lack of consideration, indefinite terms, and no final agreement. 52
First, Mosaic argued the promise of a mid-year bonus was not made at
the beginning of Stone's employment, so the promise was a mere gratuity
lacking consideration.55 The court disagreed and held that because the
negotiation occurred after Stone's termination and Stone's subsequent

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See WIMBERLY, GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW, supranote 35, at
Id.
336 Ga. App 28, 784 S.E.2d 426 (2016).
Id. at 28-30, 784 S.E.2d at 427-29.
Id. at 28-31, 784 S.E.2d at 428-30.
Id. at 31-33, 784 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 31-32, 784 S.E.2d at 430-31.

§§

1-2.
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continued employment with Mosaic, Stone's employment was conditioned upon the receipt of her mid-year bonus and Stone's continued employment was valid consideration. 54
Second, Mosaic argued the terms of the bonus agreement were too indefinite to be enforceable because of the parties' ongoing dispute regarding the minimum amount of liquidity reserves Mosaic should maintain,
the pool from which Stone's bonus would be taken, and the calculation of
bonus for shared projects.5 5 The court disagreed and found these ancillary terms were not indefinite enough to make the bonus agreement unenforceable. 56
Third, Mosaic argued Stone terminated negotiations before the parties
could finalize an agreement.5 7 The court disagreed and held there was
ample evidence for a jury to find the agreement was finalized based on
Stone's testimony that she continued her employment because of her understanding that the parties had come to an agreement regarding the
terms of her bonus.5 8
2.
Interpretation of Employment Contracts (Other than AtWill Contracts)
When interpreting the true meaning of an employment contract's
terms, Georgia courts utilize the usual rules of contract interpretation
codified in Title 13 of the O.C.G.A.59 The aim of contract interpretation is
to enforce the true intentions of the parties at the time the contract was
formed.6 0 If, from the language of the contract, the parties' intention is
legally permissible and clear, the contract is enforceable regardless of
other rules of contract construction.6 1 If the intention of the parties is not
clear, the courts look to the ordinary meaning of the contract's language
to determine the parties' intention. 62 Yet, if some of the language used is
technical, jargon, or a word of art, the language will be interpreted according to the peculiar meaning understood by local practitioners or

54. Id. at 32, 784 S.E.2d at 430.
55. Id. at 33-34, 784 S.E.2d at 431.
56. Id. The court found that there was enough evidence of an agreement as to the
amount of the liquidity pool even if the timing of payment from it may not have been definite, and the court further stated that the lack of agreement for shared projects was irrelevant because it was merely hypothetical since no shared projects ever materialized. Id.
57. Id. at 34, 784 S.E.2d at 431.
58. Id. at 34, 784 S.E.2d at 431-32.
59. O.C.G.A. tit. 13 (2010 & Supp. 2016).
60. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3 (2010).
61. Id.
62. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(2) (2010).
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tradesmen.6 3 Additionally, courts interpret terms in the light most favorable to the enforcement of the whole contract. 64
In Williams v. Columbus Clinic P.C.,65 the Georgia Court of Appeals
looked to the meaning of the words "restriction" and "proctorship" in the
context of the medical profession to determine whether, as a matter of
law, a clinic was permitted to terminate a doctor under a clause in his
employment contract.66 Williams was employed by Columbus Clinic under a valid employment contract for one year. Per the contract, the clinic
was allowed to terminate Williams early if his privileges at any hospital
were restricted.67 Shortly after he began work, the medical staff at the
hospital where Williams had privileges informed him that "the Hospital
was imposing a three- month proctorship on him."68 The clinic viewed the
proctorship as a restriction and consequently terminated him. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the clinic.6 9 The court of
appeals reversed and held that it was unclear whether a proctorship ac70
tually restricted Williams' autonomy as a practitioner.
In determining the definition of "restrict," the clinic argued that the
court should use the plain definition, while Williams argued that the
court should treat "restrict" as a term of art and apply the peculiar mean72
ing of the word in its medical context.71 The court agreed with Williams.
Utilizing the plain definition of "restrict" would result in the clinic having
an unfettered right to terminate Williams at any time. 73 This result
would be blatantly contrary to the parties' intention to create a contractual employment relationship. 74 However, by analyzing "restrict" in accordance with the definition given to it by the medical field, the parties'
intention would be better served. The court looked at the Healthcare
Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA), 75 and per the HCQIA, a restriction
is something that adversely affects a doctor's privileges.76 Proctorships
63. Id.
64. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) (2010).
65. 332 Ga. App..714, 773 S.E.2d 457 (2015).
66. Id. at 714, 773 S.E.2d at 458.
67. Id. at 715, 773 S.E.2d at 458
68. Id. at 714-17, 773 S.E.2d at 459.
69. Id. at 716, 717, 773 S.E.2d at 459, 460.
70. Id. at 722, 773 S.E.2d at 463.
71. Id. at 718-19, 773 S.E.2d at 460-61.
72. Id. at 719, 773 S.E.2d at 461.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 to 11152 (2012 & Supp. 112014).
76. Williams, 332 Ga. App. at 718, 773 S.E.2d at 461 (discussing the HCQIA). Specifically, the court reviewed the term as it was interpreted in Vineville Capital Group v.
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only adversely affect a doctor's privileges if the doctor cannot provide
medical care without the proctor's approval.77 Proctorships are not a restriction if the proctor only observes the doctor to evaluate his professional competence.78
Consequently, the court considered whether the proctorship imposed
on Williams limited his professional autonomy, constituting a "restriction" on his hospital privileges.79 The court found there were questions of fact and reversed.80
IV. BUSINESS TORTS

A. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision
Under Georgia law, an employer is required to exercise ordinary care
when selecting employees and cannot retain employees after the employer knows them to be incompetent.8 1 To maintain an action for negligent hiring, the plaintiff must prove the employer hired an employee,
which the employer knew, or should have known, from the employee's
actions or tendencies, posed a risk of inflicting the type of harm sustained
by the plaintiff.82 Usually, whether an employer used reasonable care in

hiring an employee is a question of fact unless the evidence is "plain, palpable and undisputable." 83
In Little-Thomas v. Select Specialty HospitalAugusta, Inc., 84 a patient,
Joyce, and her husband filed a negligent hiring and retention action
against a hospital after the patient was raped by her CNA, Warren Butler. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital
on both claims.8 5 On appeal, the court affirmed that summary judgment
on the plaintiffs negligent hiring claim was appropriate.8 6 Before he was
hired, Butler submitted a written application with three professional references and provided proof of his CNA certification. Then, the hospital
McCook, 329 Ga. App. 790, 795, 766 S.Ed.2d 156, 160 (2014). Williams, 332 Ga. App. at 720,
773 S.E.2d at 461. In this case, the court looked to the HCQIA and then to the National
Practitioner Data Guidebook to glean the term's meaning. Id.
77. Williams, 332 Ga. App. at 721, 773 S.E.2d at 462.
78. Id. at 721, 773 S.E.2d at 462-63.
79. Id. at 721, 773 S.E.2d at 462.
80. Id. at 722, 773 S.E.2d at 463.
81. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2008).
82. Munroe v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606 (2004).
83. Id. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Robertson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 739,
493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1997)).
84. 333 Ga. App. 362, 773 S.E.2d 480 (2015).
85. Id. at 362-63, 773 S.E.2d at 481-82.
86. Id. at 365, 773 S.E.2d at 483.
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interviewed Butler, confirmed his prior employment, and performed a
criminal background check. The hospital discovered no negative information during this interview and confirmed Butler's references. His references verified his dates of employment, but provided no further information. Butler's criminal background check included one six-year old
misdemeanor for writing a bad check. Joyce argued that, if the hospital
had been more diligent in its hiring process, it would have discovered
Butler had been previously terminated for discourteous behavior. While
Butler's previous termination may have revealed tendencies that made
Butler an unsuitable employee for other reasons, it was not evidence of
Butler's tendencies to engage in nonconsensual sexual violence, like the
violence done to Joyce.8 7 Thus, the court found the hospital's hiring process was per se reasonable.88
However, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs negligent retention claim.89 Pursuant to
a prior ruling of the Georgia Supreme Court, a plaintiff is not required to
prove the hospital knew a defendant's tendencies could result in the specific harm suffered by her, but only that the harm she suffered was
"within the risk posed by" a defendant.9 0 The court reversed because the
evidence showed Butler's coworkers and patients filed several formal
complaints with the hospital alleging that Butler had a bad attitude and
was aggressive with his patients. Specifically, they reported that Butler
would yell and cuss at patients, and handled his patients roughly. Most
significantly, Joyce provided evidence of an incident where Butler inappropriately touched a physically vulnerable female patient in an aggressive, sexual, and non-consensual way. The patient's son reported this
event to hospital staff on duty at the time it occurred.9 1 The court found
that all of these facts combined were sufficient evidence for a rational
trier of fact to conclude the hospital should have known of Butler's
92
tendencies to engage in the kind of conduct that harmed Joyce. Thus,
the court of appeals held that the trial court's grant of summary judg93
ment was inappropriate.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

364-65, 773 S.E.2d at 482-83.
365, 773 S.E.2d at 483.
367, 773 S.E.2d at 484.
366, 772 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Munroe, 277 Ga. at 863, 596 S.E.2d at 606).
366, 773 S.E.2d at 483-84.
366-67, 773 S.E.2d at 484.
367, 773 S.E.2d at 484.
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B. Tortious Interference with an Employment Contract
An action for tortious interference with an employment contract is
rooted in Georgia's laws and prohibits anyone from interfering with another's enjoyment of private property. 94 Actions are allowed against third
parties who maliciously persuade someone to breach his or her contract
with another person.95 Per the stranger doctrine, for an employee to prevail on such a claim, the third party must be a stranger to, or receive no
direct benefit from, the employee's contract.96
In Howerton v. Harbin Clinic,97 Howerton, a surgical technician, filed
various claims against multiple defendants including an action against
Dr. Kenneth Sands for tortious interference with her employment contract. Howerton was an employee of Floyd Medical Center (FMC). FMC
had a contract with Harbin Clinic under which Harbin Clinic was allowed
to use FMC's operating rooms, but FMC would supply the technicians.
Dr. Sands, a surgical doctor, was an employee of Harbin Clinic who performed surgeries in FMC's operating room with Howerton. Howerton
claimed that she was fired as a result of Dr. Sands' tortious interference
with her employment contract with FMC.98 Dr. Sands argued, and the
trial court ruled, that Howerton could not maintain her tortious interference claim against Dr. Sands because he had a direct economic interest
in her employment contract; hence "he was not a stranger to the contract."9 9 The court of appeals disagreed.oo The court found Dr. Sands had
no "direct economic interest" in Howerton's employment contract because
the relationship between Dr. Sands and Howerton was too tenuous.10 1
The relationship was a result of three separate contracts containing three
separate and distinct subject matters. 102
C. Breach of FiduciaryDuty
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-31103 requires employers to pay employees, who have
performed all their duties, all compensation owed to them. 104 Conversely,
if employees violate their duty of loyalty to their employer, employers
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30 (2000).
Howerton v. Harbin Clinic, 333 Ga. App. 191, 197, 776 S.E.2d 288, 295 (2015).
333 Ga. App. 191, 776 S.E.2d 288 (2015).
Id. at 191-98, 776 S.E.2d at 290-95.
Id. at 200, 776 S.E.2d at 296.
Id. at 191, 776 S.E.2d at 290-91.
Id. at 199-200, 776 S.E.2d at 296.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 10-6-31 (2009).
Id.
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&

1 05
may maintain a breach of fiduciary duty action and recover damages.
106
the court
During this Survey period, in Helms & Greene, LLC v. Willis,
from an
damages
recover
of appeals considered whether a business could
and
behalf
own
his
on
employee who tried, but failed, to solicit business
not on behalf of his employer.107
Helms & Greene filed a breach of fiduciary duty claim against one of
its former partners, Kirk Willis, who managed its Dallas office. While
employed with Helms & Greene, Willis submitted a proposal for Kirk
Willis P.C. to provide legal services to several potential clients. The proposals listed Kirk Willis P.C.'s address as the address of Helms
Greene's Dallas office and identified Helms & Greene's attorneys as attorneys likely to work on the potential clients' legal matters. In addition,
Willis used his Helms & Greene secretary to manage the proposals.
Nonetheless, Willis never consulted with anyone at Helms & Greene
about his proposals, and never submitted the expenses resulting from his
proposals to the firm. Some months later, Willis resigned from the firm.
The trial court reasoned that, though Willis' unreported marketing efforts were a breach of his fiduciary duty, because those efforts were unsuccessful, those efforts did not benefit Willis or damage the firm. Thus,
the trial court granted summary judgement in Willis' favor. 108
The firm appealed and argued it should have been permitted to maintain its action against Willis because, even though Willis' efforts were not
fruitful, the firm could seek to recover compensation it paid Willis during
his period of disloyalty.109 The court of appeals agreed and reversed the
trial court.110 In its reasoning, the court of appeals cited several prior
cases where it held an employee's breach of fiduciary duty negates his
right to compensation during any period in which the employee was unfaithful."
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V. VICARIOUs LIABILITY
A. Negligent Entrustment, Joint Venture, and Alter Ego
Generally, employers are held liable for the actions of their employees
under the respondeat superior theory. 112 During the Survey period, in
Cobra 4 Enterprisesv. Powell-Newman,113 the court of appeals considered
whether a corporation could be held vicariously liable for the negligent
acts of another corporation's employee based on alter ego and joint ven-

ture. 114

Newman was injured in an auto accident with Danny Ayala, an employee of Yellow Ribbon, in a truck leased to Yellow Ribbon by Cobra 4
Enterprises (Cobra 4). Ayala was arrested and charged with various traffic violations as a result of the accident. Newman filed an action for negligence against Ayala. He also filed actions for negligent entrustment and
respondeat superior liability against Yellow Ribbon and Yellow Ribbon's
owner, Gary Robertson. Newman also named Cobra 4 as a defendant as
the lessor of the truck Ayala was driving and as another corporation
owned by Robertson. Cobra 4 moved for summary judgment, arguing it
had no control of the truck at the time of Ayala's accident so it could not
be held vicariously liable. The trial court granted Cobra 4's motion as to
Newman's joint venture claim, but ruled there was sufficient evidence to
support Newman's claims of negligent entrustment and alter ego. Both
parties appealed.1 15
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that Cobra 4 and Yellow Ribbon were not engaged in a joint venture. 116 For the
corporations' relationship to be considered a joint venture, the two must
combine their assets to make a profit, and both must have an equal right
to control the conduct of the other during the venture. 117 Here, the two
corporations did not comingle funds and Cobra 4 did not have the right
to possess or direct any of its trucks while in Yellow Ribbon's posses-

sion. 118

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that there was
evidence Cobra 4 was an alter ego of Yellow Ribbon. 119 For Yellow Ribbon
and Cobra 4 to be considered alter egos, there must be evidence the two
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corporations were so intertwined that their legal separateness was just
an arrangement Robertson designed to perpetuate fraud or evade liability. 120 Whether corporations are alter egos is a question of law.121 Here,
there was some overlap between the corporations; however, they did not
share assets, did not comingle funds, had no right to control the other,
and Cobra 4 leased trucks to corporations Robertson did not own. 122 Thus,
the court found the two corporations were not interchangeable and could
not be considered alter egos. 123

B. Independent Contractor
Respondeat superior liability generally does not extend to the actions
of independent contractors.1 24 Accordingly, in determining vicarious liability, a court must first resolve if an individual is an employee or an
independent contractor. To be considered an independent contractor, the
contract must allow for the contractor to control when and how he completes his work. 125
In Royal v. Georgia FarmBureau Mutual Insurance Co., 1 26 Royal was
injured while hauling corn in a truck owned by his employer, Williams.
Williams' insurance policy did not cover her employees. Royal filed an
action against Farm Bureau arguing he was an independent contractor
so he was covered by Williams' policy. The trial court ruled Royal was an
employee of Williams and granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary
judgment. Royal appealed and argued he was an independent contractor
per the factors set out in the Restatement of Agency.1 27 Specifically, Williams argued Royal's job as a truck driver was distinct from his job as a
farmer, and driving a truck is not a usual part of Williams' business. Additionally, it was unclear if Royal was paid hourly or by the bushel, and
Williams never paid taxes on Royal's wages. 128 The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. 129 In finding an employment
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relationship existed, the court of appeals considered several factors. During his employment, Royal followed Williams' instructions or the instructions of Williams' lead driver. Both men controlled Royal's hours, route,
how much corn he hauled, how Royal did his job, and Williams gave Royal
all his equipment. 130
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under Georgia law are
becoming progressively more challenging each year due to the growing
overlap between state and federal issues, as well as growing state regulations. Regardless of whether a practitioner specializes in state, federal,
administrative, or other matters pertaining to labor and employment, it
is important to recognize and stay abreast of the ever-evolving trends,
policies, cases, and state and federal guidelines.
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